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Cosmotheoros: Spiritual Corollaries to the Rare Earth Solution to Fermi’s 
Paradox
Let me enjoy the earth no less
Because the all-enacting might
That fashioned forth its loveliness
Had other aims than my delight 
Thomas Hardy
Introduction
The most significant corollary to the discovery  that the Earth is not at the 
centre of the Universe is that humanity is not at the centre of creation. Thus 
understood, Copernicanism is a welcome call to humility in the face of 
rampant human ecological destruction fueled by human arrogance. 
Copernicus’s discovery can be understood as part of a larger, still 
incomplete, revolution that encompasses the works of Charles Darwin and 
James Lovelock. Darwin’s theory  of evolution makes humankind a result of 
the same process of evolution that produced all earthly  living beings; and 
Lovelock’s Gaia Theory underscores the dependency of humans to larger 
biotic and abiotic processes, both in the present and with regards to “deep” 
evolutionary and geological time (Primavesi, 2003). 
To believe that there is nothing special about humankind in the broader plan 
of the Universe, to hold that we are a case, rather than an exception, of the 
general laws of the Universe, is to subscribe to the mediocrity principle. A 
corollary of this principle is that, given the proper conditions, intelligent 
civilizations should emerge on other planets. What are these conditions? 
Since many of them are insufficiently known, estimates on the amount of 
extraterrestrial intelligence “out there” vary wildly. However, in spite of the 
optimism of theorists such as Frank Drake, evidence of extraterrestrial 
civilizations has yet to surface. The contradiction between the apparent high 
probability  of extraterrestrial life (given the vast amount of stars, the 
considerable age of the Galaxy and the mediocrity principle) and the lack of 
evidence for actual extra-terrestrial life has been dubbed the “Fermi 
Paradox”, after Enrico Fermi’s 1950 comment “where are they?” after 
estimating the chances of extraterrestrial visits to the earth to be extremely 
high. Even if no advanced extraterrestrial civilizations have visited the earth 
(perhaps through not being interested), traces of technological activities such 
as radio waves should be detectable (this is known as the Great Silence 
Problem).
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Fermi’s Paradox potentially poses a challenge to Copernicanism, as it could 
indicate that the Earth (and its human civilization) is, in fact, rare or unique 
(Ćirković, 2009). This paper ponders the consequences for Copernicanism 
(understood as an attitude of humility with regards to the greater plan of the 
Universe) of this “Rare Earth” solution to Fermi’s paradox.1 We will illustrate 
Copernicanism through an exploration of the thoroughly Copernican text 
Cosmotheoros, written by Christian Huygens in 1695. Then, we will propose 
a way of preserving a Copernican outlook while at the same time holding a 
Rare Earth solution to Fermi’s paradox. This proposal entails adding Gaian 
gratitude to Copernican humility.
Briefly, we propose that to hold both 1) that the Universe is not designed for 
humankind, and that humankind is in no way special in the larger plan of 
creation (Copernicanism) and 2) that a planet holding complex life forms, 
such as the Earth, is indeed a rare cosmological occurrence (rare earth 
solution to Fermi’s Paradox) implies viewing the Earth and its evolutionary 
history as a miracle and as a gift; as something freely given that should be 
treated with awe and gratitude. 
1. The Copernican Revolution and Dark Enlightenment.
The pre-Copernican view of the Universe, challenged by Galileo, Kepler, 
Bruno and Copernicus, was inherently comfortable to hold and in accordance 
with dominant Christian theology. The view of the earth as the centre of the 
Universe meshed well with the idea that humanity was at the centre of God’s 
gaze and purpose, and with the idea that all of creation was meant to serve 
man (Primavesi, 2003). Earth, in the pre-Copernican view, was neither a 
planet nor a celestial body; it was a sui generis thing, an earth, of which there 
was only one, at the center of the Universe. The Copernican system turned 
the earth into one planet among others. Brecht’s character in Life of Galileo 
called “the Very Old Cardinal” captures the rejection that the Copernican 
system produced very well; it is a rejection based on an idea of the self that 
feels threatened:
I am not any old creature on any insignificant star briefly circling in no 
particular place. I am walking with a firm step, on a fixed earth; it is 
motionless, it is the centre of the Universe. I am at the centre and the 
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1This solution is one among many possibilities (others being, for example, that 
extra-terrestrials have taken steps to avoid contact; that contact, though not 
extraterrestrial life itself, is much harder than usually assumed; or that gamma ray 
bursts periodically wipe out civilizations in such a way that estimations on the time 
available to produce intelligent life are off the mark, making life rare in time, if not 
in space; see Ćirković, 2009). 
eye of the Creator falls on me and on me alone (Brecht, quoted in 
Primavesi, 2003, p. 26)
The Cardinal expresses concern about the mobility of the Earth, and the fact 
that it occupies “no particular place”. In Ptolemaic astronomy, space was in 
fact organized around the earth.  However, strictly speaking, the cardinal is 
not worried about the Earth’s centrality, but about his own:
Above all [the Copernican Revolution] meant to turn away from the 
central position in the Universe given to man by God.
The Copernican Revolution also involved a turning towards an 
unfamiliar, threatening and incalculable position: one in which the 
earth, the centre of our world, is no longer the centre of the Universe. 
The closely knit and compact Universe was gone (…) The 
comfortable, secure interrelation of space and destiny was threatened. 
And here lies the real cause for unease. It is our own position in the 
Universe (…) that is seen to be at stake. (Primavesi, 2003, 18).
It is man’s hierarchical superiority over the rest of creation that is threatened 
by Copernicanism, in at least two specific ways: 1) if the Universe was not 
created for man, then it cannot be assumed that other parts of creation are 
there for the purpose of serving man (animals don’t exist for the purpose of 
giving man their skins, hides and milk; and stars don’t exist to facilitate 
navigation); and 2) if man is not at the centre of creation, neither is he 
centrally  important to the Universe: one can conceive of a God or Universe to 
which men’s lives and travails are as marginal as Earth’s position in the Milky 
Way. In Douglas Adams’s science fiction classic The Hithchhiker’s Guide to 
the Galaxy (1995), the most important intergalactic encyclopedia in the 
Universe has only two words to say about the our planet: mostly harmless.
 
At stake is the “homocentric claim that man is at the centre of God’s regard, 
and therefore at the centre of the Universe” (Primavesi, 2003, 20). Christian 
Huygens, awed by the great size of Jupiter and Saturn as compared to that 
of the Earth, exclaims:
This shows us how vast those Orbs must be, and how inconsiderable 
this Earth, the Theatre upon which all our mighty Designs, all our 
Navigations, and all our Wars are transacted, is when compared to 
them. A very fit Consideration and matter of Reflection, for those Kings 
and Princes who sacrifice the Lives of so many People only to flatter 
their ambition in being Masters of the same pitiful corner of this small 
Spot. (Huygens, 1698, 141-142).
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It is somewhat surprising that Spinoza, perhaps the seventeenth century’s 
greatest combatant of anthropocentrism, who also had a vivid interest in 
science, and especially in optics, does not explicitly  treat the subject of 
Copernicanism in his work. However,  Spinoza’s system is a paradigmatic 
example of what Yovel (1990) calls “dark enlightenment”; that is, the 
realization that the Universe is neither designed for me nor geared towards 
my production and that humans are simply another manifestation of God or 
Nature’s impersonal, non-teleological laws:
For in Spinoza’s ontology I am, in both body and mind, the product of 
an impersonal substance-God which has no human-like features and 
may not be anthropomorphized; in other words, the natural processes 
which produce me bear no resemblance to my own subjectivity; they 
do not work by  intention and purpose, have no privileged affinity  to 
human affairs and allow no room or special laws for history  as 
distinguished from the rest of nature.” (Yovel, 1990, 166)
As we shall see in the next section, Huygens does believe in a purposeful 
God, but it is a God that shows no particular preference towards humankind 
or their abode, the Earth.  Therefore, the term “dark enlightenment” can be 
applied to both Huygens and Spinoza if it is used in a broad sense to mean a 
view of the Universe in which humankind and the Earth occupy no special 
place, have no particular importance in it nor serve any special purpose. 
Dark enlightenment is an invitation to humility, an invitation to view “all our 
mighty Desings, all our Navigations, all our Wars” from a cosmic, de-centered 
perspective, shedding our ingrained anthropocentrism. It is also a call to 
wonder, a call to view creation as a whole far more rich and complex than 
what we see from our limited and marginal perspective. A  rejection of 
anthropocentrism through humility and a sense of wonder at the marvels of 
creation are two very desirable attitudes in relation to the current ecological 
crisis. The threat that Fermi’s paradox poses to Copernicanism is also a 
threat to these attitudes. In the next section, we will explore the Copernican 
mindset in detail through a reading of Huygen’s Cosmotheoros, a 
compendium of speculations regarding life on other planets, published 
originally in 1697. It is an elaborate, well thought-out expression of a 
Copernican view of the Universe, that expresses awe and humility towards 
creation,   and also it is spectacularly wrong in its speculations. 
2. Cosmotheoros: A Copernican view of Life, the Universe and 
Everything
At the outset of his work, after briefly explaining the Copernican system and 
pointing out that Jupiter and Saturn possess satellites, Huygens takes on the 
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possible objection that his speculations on extraterrestrial life go against 
scripture:
(…) when they hear us talk of new Lands, and Animals endued with as 
much Reason as themselves will be ready to fly out into religious 
Exclamations, that we set up  Conjectures against the Word of God, 
and broach Opinions directly opposite to Holy Writ. For we do not 
there read one word of the Production  of such Creatures, no not so 
much as of their Existence; nay rather we read the quite contrary. For, 
That only  mentions this Earth with its Animals and Plants, and Man the 
Lord of them; but as for Worlds in the Sky, ‘tis wholly silent (…) it’s 
evident that God had no design to make a particular Enumeration in 
the Holy  Scriptures, of all the Works of his Creation. When therefore it 
is plain that under the general name of Stars or Earth are 
comprehended all the Heavenly Bodies, even the little Gentlemen 
round Jupiter and Saturn, why must all that multitude of Beings in 
which the Almighty Creator has been pleased to place upon them, be 
excluded the Privilege, and not suffer’d to have a share in the 
Expression? And these Men themselves can’t but know in what sense 
it is that all things are said to be made for the use of Man, not certainly 
for us to stare or peep  through a Telescope at; for that’s little better 
than nonsense. Since then the greatest part of God’s Creation, that 
innumerable multitude of Stars, is plac’d out of the reach of any man’s 
Eye; and many of them, it’ likely, of the best Glasses, so that they don’t 
seem to belong to us; is it such an unreasonable Opinion, that there 
are some reasonable Creatures who see and admire those glorious 
Bodies at a nearer distance? (Huygens, 1698, 6-8)
Huygens, unlike Spinoza, believes in a purposeful God. The Universe that 
the Copernican system describes (enormous, full of planets akin to the Earth) 
could not be created by a purposeful God for the sole benefit of human 
beings, there being so many stars and so enormous distances in outer 
space. If Earth is but one planet among many (smaller than many, and also 
with fewer moons than planets such as Jupiter or Saturn), and not located in 
any special place in the Universe, it does in fact seem strange that only this 
planet would benefit from intelligent life forms, if one supposes a purposeful 
God behind the creation of the Universe.
If God were to give equal importance to each planet, He ought to have 
populated all of them with as much life, beauty and intelligence as our own; in 
this paper, we shall call this idea a parity principle. The astronomical 
evidence of the time showed that Earth was a planet similar to, and in no way 
distinct from, the rest of the solar system:
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Having thus explained [the Copernican system], there’s no body I 
suppose but, sees, that in the first the Earth is made to be of the same 
sort with the rest of the Planets. For the very Position of the Circles 
shows it. And that the other Planets are round like it, and like it receive 
all the Light they have from the Sun, there’s no room (since the 
discoveries made by Telescopes) to doubt. Another thing they  are like 
it in is, that they are moved round their own Axis; for since ‘tis certain 
that Jupiter and Saturn are, who can doubt the others? Again, as the 
Earth has its Moon moving round it, so Jupiter and Saturn have theirs. 
Now since in so many things they thus agree, what can be more 
probable that in others they agree too; and that the other Planets are 
as beautiful  and as well stock’d with Inhabitants as the Earth? or what 
shadow of Reason can there be why they should not? (Huygens, 
1698, 17-18)
Huygens shifts the burden of proof to those who would deny extraterrestrial 
life. The similarities among planets and the absence of additional evidence 
permit analogical thinking:
If anyone should be at the dissection of a Dog, and be there shewn the 
intrails, the Heart, the Stomach, Liver, Lungs and Guts (…) could such 
a Man reasonably doubt whether there were the same Contexture and 
Variety of Parts in a Bullock, Hog, or any  other Beast, tho he had never 
chanc’d to see the like opening of them? 
#
Huygens explains that his work has a dual moral purpose: 1) to produce 
humility  in men with regards to their importance in relation to the whole of the 
Universe and 2) to produce awe and admiration at God, the creator and 
designer, not only of this world but of a great many worlds:
(…) besides the Nobleness and Pleasure of the Studies, may not we 
be so bold as to say, they  are no small help to the advancement of 
Wisdom and Morality? so far are they  from being of no use at all. For 
here we may mount from this dull Earth, and viewing it from on high, 
consider whether Nature has laid out all her cost and finery upon this 
small speck of Dirt. So, like Travellers into other distant Countrys, we 
shall be better able to judg of what’s done at home, know how to make 
a true estimate of, and set its own value upon every  thing. We shall be 
less apt to admire what this World calls great, shall nobly  despise 
those Trifles the generality  of Men set their Affections on, when we 
know that there are a multitude of such Earths inhabited and adorned 
as well as our own. And we shall worship and reverence that God the 
Maker of all these things; we shall admire and adore his Providence 
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and wonderful Wisdom which is displayed and manifested all over the 
Universe (…) (Huygens, 1698, 10-11) 
In accordance to the parity  principle, the other planets have as much, or 
perhaps more, biodiversity than the Earth. Huygens invites us to consider the 
difference “(…) between the ants, the Spider, the Fly and the Butterfly, and of 
that prodigy  in that wonderful change from worms” (1698, 35); just among 
insects, the differences are enormous. If each of the planets is as amazingly 
diverse as the Earth, the total biodiversity of the Universe should be 
astounding. Huygens’s God, like Leibniz’s, is a maximizer of diversity.
Just as Huygens grants all planets biodiversity, he grants their inhabitants the 
faculties of sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell; as well as the capacity for 
pleasure, and the ability  to study and admire God’s creation. There is a 
generosity that permeates Huygens’s work: for example, when discussing the 
existence of extraterrestrial plants, Hugens states: “(…) the Planets may be 
allow’d some Bodys capable of moving themselves, not at all inferior to ours, 
for why should they? And these are Animals. Now for fear of starving those 
poor creatures, we must have Plants, you know” (1698, 21).
Huygens sees the features of the Earth as gifts from God, and considers it 
necessary to bestow them, also, to other planets. Here are his arguments for 
bestowing eyes upon the extraterrestrials, both animals and intelligent 
beings:
Then if we consider the wonderful nature of Light, and the amazing 
Artifice in the fit framing the eye for the reception of it, we cannot but 
see that Bodies so vastly  remote could not be view’d by  us in their 
proper Figures and just Distances, any other way than by Sight. (…) 
And the nice Curiosity of this Perception is admirable, in that it is 
caused by the smallest Particle of that fine Matter, and can at the 
same time determine the Coast from whence the Motion comes; in 
that all these different Roads of Motion, these Waves crossing and 
interfering with one another, are yet no hindrance to every ones free 
passage. All these things are so wisely, so wonderfully contrived, that 
it’s above the power of humane Wit, not to invent or frame somewhat 
like them, but even to imagine and comprehend them. For what can be 
more amazing, than that a Particle of Body should be so devised and 
framed, as by its means to show us the Shape, the Position, the 
Distance, and all the Motions, nay and all the  Colours, distinguishing 
of a Body that is far remote from us? And then the artful Composition 
of the Eye, drawing an exact Picture of the Objects without it, upon the 
concave side of the Choroides, is even above all admiration, nor is 
there any thing in which God has more plainly manifested his excellent 
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Geometry. And these things are not only contrived and framed with so 
great Wisdom and Skill, as not to admit of better, but to any one that 
considers them attentively, they seem to be of such a nature as not to 
allow any other Method. For it’s impossible that Light should represent 
Objects to us at so vast a distance, except by  such an intervening 
Motion; and it’s as impossible that any other Composition of the Eye 
should be equally fitted to the reception of such Impressions. So that I 
cannot but think them mightily out, that maintain these things might 
have been contrived many other ways. It’s likely then, and credible, 
that in these things the Planets have an exact correspondence with us, 
and that their Animals have the same Organs, and use the same way 
of sight that we do. Well then they have Eyes (…) And if we must allow 
them all Animals for the preservation of their Life, how much more 
must they that make more, and more noble uses of them, not be 
deprived of the Blessing of so advantageous Members? For by them 
we view the various Flowers, and the elegant Features of Beauty: with 
them we read, we write, we contemplate the Heavens and Stars, and 
measure their Distances, Magnitudes, and Journeys (Huygens, 1698, 
44-47)
The eye is so perfectly designed for its purpose that it’s hard to think of an 
alternative way of accomplishing it. And, of course, sight itself cannot be 
denied to extraterrestrials. Not only  is it useful for the preservation of life, it is 
also necessary for the study and contemplation of creation which, as we shall 
see, is the greatest gift that God bestows upon the manifold planets.
First, let us discuss pleasure. Is this something that only terrestrial animals 
should enjoy? According to Huygens: 
(…) the senses were not wholly design’d for use; but Men from all, and 
all other Animals from some of them, reap  Pleasure as well as Profit, 
as from the Tast in delicious Meats, from the Smell in Flowers and 
Perfumes; from the Sight in the contemplation of beauteous Shapes 
and Colours (…)
Since it is thus, I think ‘tis but reasonable to allow the Inhabitants of 
the Planets these same advantages that we have from them. For upon 
this consideration only, how much happier and easier a man’s life is 
render’d by  the enjoyment of hem, we must be obliged to grant them 
these Blessings, except we would ingross every  thing that is good to 
ourselves, as if we were worthier and more deserving than anything 
else (…) (1698, 51-52)
It would be selfish to deny a gift as great as pleasure to the rest of the 
planets (or, indeed, to other earthly animals, as we will discuss at the end of 
this section).  In Huygen’s arguments, the greater the gift, the more it should 
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be equally bestowed upon all planets. It is in this light that the question of 
whether there are extraterrestrials possessing reason and understanding. 
According to Huygens, the narrowly practical purposes served by  reason are 
not to be held in such high esteem:
And in those things wherein Men provide and take care only of what’s 
absolutely necessary  for the preservation of their Life; in defending 
themselves from the Injuries of the Air; in securing themselves against 
the Incursions of Enemies by  Walls; and against Fraud and 
Disturbances and Laws; in educating their Children and providing for 
themselves and them: In all these I can see no great reason that Man 
has to boast of the preeminency of his Reason above Beasts and 
other Animals. For most of these things they perform with greater ease 
and art than us, and some of them they have no need of. For that 
sense of Virtue and Justice in which Man excels, of Friendship, 
Gratitude and Honesty, of what use are they, but either to put a stop  to 
the wickedness of Men, or to secure us from mutual Assaults and 
Injuries, a thing wherein Beasts want no Guide but Nature and 
Inclination? Then if we set before our eyes the manifold Cares, the 
disturbances of Mind, the restless Desires , the dread of Death, that 
are the results of this our Reason; and compare them with that easy, 
quiet, and harmless Life which other Animals enjoy, we should be apt 
to wish a change, and conclude that they, especially the Birds, liv’d 
with more pleasure and happiness than Man could with all his Wisdom 
(…) (1698, 58-59).
Whatever practical advantages are brought about by  reason are outweighed 
by reason’s worries and the capacity to do harm that it brings; so that the lot 
of Birds seems preferable. What is, then, the true purpose of reason?
What is then after all that sets human Reason above all other, and 
makes us preferable to the rest of the Animal World? Nothing in my 
mind so much as the contemplation of the Works of God, and the 
study of Nature and the improving those Sciences which may bring us 
to some knowledge in their Beauty and Variety. For without Knowledge 
what would be Contemplation? And what difference is there between a 
Man, who with careless supine negligence views the Beauty and use 
of the Sun, and the fine golden Furniture of the Heaven, and one who 
with learned Niceness searches into their Courses; who understands 
wherein the Fixt Stars, as they are call’d, differ from the Planets, and 
what is the reason of the regular Vicissitude of the Seasons; who by 
the sound reasoning can measure the magnitude and distance of the 
Sun and Planets? Or between such and one as admires perhaps the 
nimble Activity and strange Motions of some Animals, and one that 
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knows their whole Structure, understands the whole Fabrik and 
Architecture of their composition? (Huygens, 1698, 60-61)
Huygens makes a distinction between idle contemplation and scientific 
contemplation; and posits the latter as the highest purpose of human reason. 
The principal use of reason is not, then, as Francis Bacon would have it, to 
know causes in order to produce effects, but rather an informed, studious 
contemplation of God’s creation. Reason is an aid to contemplation, not an 
aid to technology. Huygens goes on to speculate on extraterrestrial sciences. 
First among them is astronomy, of course, “For supposing the Earth, as we 
did, one of the Planets of equal dignity and honor with the rest, who would 
Venture to say, that no where else were to be found any that enjoy’d the 
glorious sights of Nature’s Opera?” (Huygens, 1698, 62).
By now, the ecological import of Huygens’ Copernican attitudes should be 
clear. Science and reason are subservient to the contemplation of God’s 
work; science is an enterprise that should be accompanied by awe (rather 
than, for example, greed). The Earth is not the center of the Universe, and is 
as is as deserving of God’s gifts as any other planet; man is not the centre of 
the Universe, and is as deserving of God’s gifts as any other creature. In fact, 
as pointed out above, Huygens sees reason to envy birds:
#
For they have as great a gusto of bodily Pleasures as we, let the new 
Philosophers say what they will, who would have them go for nothing 
but Clocks and Engines of the Flesh; a thing which Beasts so plainly 
confute by crying and running away from a stick, and all other actions, 
that I wonder how anyone could subscribe to so absurd and cruel an 
Opinion. Nay I can scarce doubt that Birds feel no small pleasure in 
their easy, smooth sailing through the Air; and much more If they but 
knew the advantages it hath above our slow and laborious 
Progression (1698, 59-60)
Huygens’ Copernican humility is coupled with a rejection of Descartes, who 
would make man the sole owner of consciousness, res cogitans, and thus 
the ability to feel pleasure or pain.
#
Of course, it is not true that every  planet has life in it, much less intelligent life 
capable of contemplating “Nature’s Opera”. Available evidence indicates that 
Jupiter and Saturn, with all their satellites, are empty and barren. Does this 
threaten Copernican humility  and awe at creation? Are we to return to pre-
Copernican arrogance, and to feel and act as if we are the center and 
purpose of the Universe?
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Current astronomical knowledge, coupled with the still-operative mediocrity 
principle, has led many in the scientific community  to believe that 
extraterrestrial life (although not present in every  planet) is abundant, 
proximate and complex enough to justify the search for extraterrestrial 
intelligence (SETI). So far, the search has yielded no results, disappointing 
expectations. 
3. Fermi’s Paradox as a challenge to Copernicanism
In physics or engineering, a Fermi problem is an estimated calculation based 
on informed guesses. It is named after Enrico Fermi , who was especially 
good at such problems. In 1950, at Los Alamos Laboratory, while casually 
discussing a New Yorker cartoon with colleagues, the renowned physicist 
performed one such calculation regarding the probability of the Earth being 
visited by extra-terrestrials. Assuming the mediocrity principle, and  factoring 
in the age of the Universe (that is, the time for intelligent life to evolve in other 
planets), the times and distances presumed to be required for space travel, 
the sheer number of possibly  life-harboring planets, the fact that life tends to 
expand by colonizing new habitats, Fermi concluded that the Earth should 
have been visited many times over already (at the very least we should be 
able to detect some evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence, such as probes 
or non-random radio signals). Hence Fermi’s question: where is everybody? 
After 1950, new scientific discoveries have in fact exacerbated the FP, 
making contact with extraterrestrial intelligence even more theoretically  likely. 
Among these are the discovery of large numbers of extra-solar planets; the 
confirmation that life originated on Earth in a brief astronomical time; the 
discovery of microorganisms capable of living in very extreme conditions 
(which widens the spectrum of likely habitats for extraterrestrial life); and an 
improved understanding of how life originated from abiotic elements through 
natural means (see (Ćirković, 2009, 3-4).
Fermi’s Paradox, like matters concerning extraterrestrial life and intelligence 
in general, is sometimes seen as a marginal matter, of concern only  to 
science fiction enthusiasts and wild-eyed believers who treat the possibility  of 
contact with extraterrestrials as a kind of secular transcendence (see e.g, 
Clarke, 1972). The case for the importance of Fermi’s Paradox can be made 
as follows:
1) The suppositions leading to the prediction of contact with 
extraterrestrials are central to our scientific thinking in general. For 
example: naturalism (a key principle in biology and evolutionary 
science), Copernicanism (central to astronomy), or gradualism (a well 
established principle in biology, geology and linguistics). 
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2) The fact that no evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence has been 
found implies that one or more of these basic assumptions are wrong. 
In particular, the assumption that the evolution of complex life forms is 
a natural occurrence (the alternative being some form of creationism, 
postulating a purposeful creator) is threatened.
3) Therefore, Fermi’s Paradox “challenges some of the deepest 
ph i losoph ica l and cu l tu ra l foundat ions o f the modern 
civilization” (Ćirković, 2009, 2). Thus, “resolving FP is not a luxury  but 
one of the imperatives if we wish our scientific worldview to have even 
remote prospect of completeness” (Ćirković, 2009, 16).
If we take into account the age of the Galaxy and the amount of planets in it, 
and if we assume that 1) life originates naturally wherever favorable 
circumstances occur (naturalism); 2) the Earth is not a particular or special 
place in the Universe and we should expect similar places elsewhere 
(Copernicanism) and 3) that biological, cultural and technological change 
occurs in a gradual and continuous manner over time (gradualism; as 
opposed to catastrophism, which contemplates fits and starts in these 
processes, brought about by catastrophic events); then we should expect a 
large amount of extraterrestrial intelligence in our vicinity, and should be 
nearly  certain of some form of contact. The absence of contact implies 
abandoning one of these assumptions (among other more fanciful 
possibilities which are not contemplated here, see Ćirković, 2009). 
Fermi’s Paradox vanishes if we postulate a special theological origin of life 
(abandoning naturalism); or if we reject the notion that Earth-like planets are 
relatively common (threatening Copernicanism). Finally, the calculations 
regarding the age of the Galaxy need to be re-evaluated if we postulate 
periodical cosmic catastrophes (such as gamma-ray bursts from the 
coalescence of binary neutron stars or hyper nova explosions, which would 
cause mass extinctions in exposed planets) which would re-set the 
evolutionary clock on nearby planets (jettisoning gradualism), making life rare 
in time, not in space (see Ćirković, 2004)
There is a lot of merit to the gamma-ray burst solution to Fermi’s Paradox 
(see, e.g Ćirković, 2004). In general, all proposed solutions are hypothetical 
and speculative. We are interested here in the corollaries that result from 
adopting the Rare Earth hypothesis and the tension it creates in relation to 
Copernicanism, not in defending it against competing hypotheses. We will 
explore this solution to the FP further in the following section.
4.  The Rare Earth Solution and Gaia
In his Copernican rejection of anthropocentrism, Christian Huygens referred 
to the Earth as a “small speck of Dirt”, based upon the astronomical fact that 
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the Earth is a planet, a celestial body orbiting a star, just like Jupiter or 
Saturn. However, as it turns out, Earth may be seen as a different sort of 
thing altogether: whereas the atmospheres of Jupiter, Saturn or Mars are in 
chemical equilibrium, the “terrestrial atmosphere contains gases like oxygen 
and methane, which are very likely to react with each other but coexist in 
high proportions, resulting in a mixture of gases far from chemical 
equilibrium” (Capra, 1996, 101). The composition of the Earth’s atmosphere 
is due to the action of living beings upon it, such as animal respiration and 
the production of oxygen by plants. At the same time, this composition of the 
atmosphere is what makes life possible on Earth! Life on Earth not only 
makes the atmosphere but keeps it at a constant composition favorable for 
life. This indicates that the Earth as a whole is a self-regulating, self-
producing system that has life as both an output and an input. It is not a 
planet that happens to have life in it, but a living planet. This important insight 
of James Lovelock (1979) is called the Gaia Theory, which has given rise to 
the science of geophisiology (see Volk, 1998).
It is commonly thought that life on Earth is possible because of one happy 
coincidence; that the Earth is at just the right distance from the sun, Mars 
being too cold, Venus too hot. This does not take into account the fact that 
the Sun has become twenty-five percent hotter since the beginning of life on 
Earth, and yet the temperature of the Earth has remained constant. The 
Earth’s organisms regulate temperature by, for example, collectively 
producing a level of CO2 that, through the greenhouse effect, keeps the 
Earth suitably warm for life (human produced climate change should not be 
seen as humans producing toxic stuff, but rather as humans messing with 
Earth’s self-regulating mechanism, not only  by emitting excessive CO2 but 
also, for example, by  cutting down CO2 sequestering forests). Another 
example of climate regulation is the emission of dimethyl sulfide (DMS) by 
both algae and coral reefs; DMS helps produce clouds in the sky, which, in 
turn, reflect the rays of the sun, regulating the Earth’s temperature.
Gaia theory does not state that the Earth is teleologically designed for life, 
but rather that, in geological and evolutionary time, certain negative feedback 
loops have evolved over time in such a way that a total Earth system 
(comprising both biological and non biological processes). What evolves is 
not the Darwinian individual or species, but the total system. Picture, for 
example, a perfect predator, from which no prey could hope to escape. Soon, 
such a predator would be extinct, having exhausted all sources of prey. The 
mechanisms of evolution do not produce well adapted species or individuals, 
but rather well adapted, self regulating, systems produced by co-evolution.
In this sense, the Earth is more than a mere planet or “speck of Dirt”; Earth is 
astronomically  a planet, just like Jupiter or Saturn; but, geophysiologically, it 
The Trumpeter
ISSN: 0832-6193
Volume 27, Number 3 (2011)
German Ulises Bula                                                                                                                                             135
is, as far as we have been able to tell, a sui generics sort of thing. The Earth 
is a rather dull astronomical object; a smallish planet, bereft of rings, and in 
possession of a single satellite, which can only produce two kinds of eclipse 
(as compared, for example, to Jupiter’s large variety of occulations and 
transits produced by  its satellites big and small). Seen from a 
geophysiological perspective, Earth is a rare and wonderful sort of thing.
A way to look at the Rare Earth Hypothesis is to think about the different 
factors that need to be present so that a self-regulating living planet may 
occur. An intelligent species capable of communicating with humans, or of 
producing detectable traces, can only evolve in a Gaia-like planet that can 
sustain life for a sufficiently long evolutionary  time (Watson, 2004). There 
appears to be evidence of microscopic life in Mars, and perhaps microscopic 
life on other planets is not very rare; the rarity lies in extraterrestrial life being 
diverse and complex enough to regulate its planet’s atmosphere.
What needs to happen in order for a Gaia-like planet to occur? Ward and 
Brownlee (2000) have outlined a number of critical steps in order to achieve 
complex metazoan life, each of which can be ascribed a certain probability. 
The rarity of a Gaia-like planet is the probability of all of these critical steps to 
occur. Among them:
· Circumstellar habitable zone: a habitable planet needs to be in the 
very narrow interval of distances from the parent star.
· “Rare moon”: having a large moon to stabilize the planetary axis is 
crucial for the long term climate stability.
· “Rare Jupiter”: having a giant planet (“Jupiter”) at the right distance 
to deflect much of the incoming cometary and asteroidal material 
enables sufficiently low level of impact catastrophes.
· "Rare elements": Radioactive r-elements (especially  U and Th) 
need to be present in the planetary interior in sufficient amount to 
enable plate tectonics and functioning of the carbon-silicate cycle.
·  "Rare Cambrian-explosion analogs": the evolution of complex 
metazoans requires exceptional physical, chemical and geological 
conditions for episodes of sudden diversication and expansion of 
life. (Ćirković, 2009, 9)
Another example is the evolution of photosynthesis, which is key to biotic 
atmospheric regulation (Watson, 2004) and which, being produced through 
evolution, required a chance mutation. The probability  of several events 
(each with a given probability) all occurring can be derived by expressing the 
probability  of each as a fraction with a numerator of one, and then multiplying 
all the denominators. The likelihood of a rare moon, for example, is, say 
1/100; and that of the presence of rare elements, 1/1000. The probability of 
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both in a single planet would therefore be 1/100000. The probability of 
favorable conditions for the emergence of a Gaia-like planet vanishes as we 
add rare factors that need to occur.
Some of these “rare” factors can be disputed; for example the contention that 
Jupiter acts as a “meteor shield” for the Earth has been questioned (see 
Ćirković, 2009, 10; if this is so, however, the implications for Huygen’s 
Copernicanism would be rather interesting: Jupiter would cease to be a 
planet of equal or greater dignity than the Earth- because of its greater size 
and many satellites- and become a mere shield-bearer for our planet). At the 
same time, the sheer amount of Gaian conditions, each of which is produced 
by chance, gives credence to the Rare Earth Hypothesis. The Earth was 
lucky in having some initial conditions favorable for the emergence of life, 
but, without the emergence of a Gaian self regulating system, the climate and 
chemistry of the planet would not “have persisted in a state favourable for life 
indefinitely” (Primavesi, 2009, 124). The emergence of such a system 
required additional luck.
Ćirković (2009), following Fry (1995) criticizes the Rare Earth Hypothesis on 
the grounds that postulating Gaia-like planets to be extremely  unlikely, the 
hypothesis can be, in some respects, “equivalent to the doctrines openly 
violating naturalism, e.g., creationism.” (p. 10) The argument goes as follows: 
If one postulates complex life in a self-regulating biosphere to be a natural 
event with an astronomically small chance of occurring (say, 10-100), 
(…) then a curious situation arises in which an opponent can argue 
that supernatural origin of life is clearly a more plausible hypothesis! 
Namely, even a fervent atheist could not rationally  claim that her 
probability  of being wrong on this metaphysical issue is indeed smaller 
than 10-100, knowing what we know on the fallibility  of human cognition. 
According to the dominant rules of inference, we would have been 
forced to accept the creationist position, if no other hypothesis were 
present. (Ćirković 2009, 10)
In other words, since the Rare Earth Hypothesis implies postulating an 
astronomically  small probability  for the emergence of complex life, one would 
be forced to accept the creationist standpoint if one gave a significantly 
higher probability to human beings (a lot of whom are creationists)  being 
right.
Ćirković’s and Fry’s criticism rests on a logical fallacy that we will state 
presently  and expound upon in the following section. The Rare Earth 
Hypothesis does not postulate that complex life in the universe is extremely 
improbable; it postulates that life in a given planet, is extremely improbable. 
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An extremely improbable event is, indeed, bound to happen, if it is given 
enough chances to occur. This does not violate naturalism, but rather is a 
consequence of the Law of Large Numbers.
5.  On Miracles
Last July, Ms. Joan Ginther, of Texas, won the lottery  for the fourth time since 
1993 (Hawley, 2010). What are the odds? As a matter of fact, around 200 
million to one. This is the sort of event that we consider to be miraculous, 
because it is so unlikely. One is tempted to say that Ms Ginther is favored by 
the Gods. However, her good fortune not only does not break the laws of 
probability, but rather it confirms them. Given the total number of people in 
the world that buy lottery tickets regularly  and the amount of time elapsed 
since the invention of the lottery, a winner of four lotteries was practically a 
necessity. That someone, anyone, wins the lottery four times over their 
lifetime is a very likely event; that a given person does, is extremely unlikely.
Rolling snake-eyes (a pair of ones) on a pair of dice 5 times in a row is a very 
unlikely event; less than one in sixty million. More precisely 1/60,466,176. 
However, if I make sixty and a half million attempts, it is a statistic necessity 
that, at some point, I get just such a result. If we define a miracle as an 
occurrence that only happens one in a million times, miracles happen 295 
times a day  in the United States, given that country’s population (Shermer, 
2004). It is a statistical necessity that, “an event with a low probability  of 
occurrence in a small number of trials has a high probability of occurrence in 
a large number of trials” (Shermer, 2004, 32).
Therefore, from the perspective of a third person, we should not be surprised 
that miracles occur2 . However, let’s get back to Ms Joan Ginther of Texas. 
Should she be surprised at her fortune? Of course! The odds of her winning 
the lottery  were extremely small! She should jump up  and down and be 
grateful for her good fortune!
The Law of Large Numbers affords us two perspectives on miracles. The 
third person perspective explains how miracles are to be expected as a 
statistical necessity, and, therefore, naturalistic in origin and without the need 
for a supernatural explanation. However, the question of to whom, the 
miracle occurs is a different matter. From the first person perspective, 
miracles are indeed miraculous, and whoever they occurred to was indeed a 
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2 Of course, extremely unlikely bad things also happen to people, as well as things 
that are simply odd. Last July, a few days after Mrs. Ginther won the lottery, a group 
of Australian muggers chased an Ipod bearing med-student into a dark alley, 
precisely in front of a Ninja School from where a pack of fully customed Ninjas 
emerged to beat them up and help the student! (Doctorow, 2010).
very lucky person. This, however, does not need a theological or teleological 
explanation.
According to the Rare Earth Hypothesis, complex life in the Universe is not 
something astronomically unlikely; but it is quite unlikely  in a given planet. 
The Universe is sufficiently large, and has a sufficient number of planets, for 
complex life to occur somewhere. The Earth was an extremely lucky planet.
According to this Hypothesis, we humans are witnesses and protagonists to 
an astronomically unlikely event, by pure chance. This seems like a stretch, 
until we take into account observer self-selection (see Watson, 2004). The 
only way the Universe can be observed is if an observer observes it; but an 
observer can only occur in precisely that very strange and unlikely part of the 
Universe where observers can evolve. Therefore, an observer must 
necessarily observe a very strange and unlikely sample of the Universe. It is 
only natural that such an observer will initially  take his part of the Universe to 
be typical and, like Huygens, assume that other planets also evolve 
observers. It’s reasonable to assume, ceteris paribus, that whatever part of 
the Universe I am looking at is typical (the mediocrity principle); but, of 
course, atypical things can and do occur. In the case of a living, Gaia-like 
planet, the reason I can observe it is that it is an atypical planet.
The Rare Earth Hypothesis needs to jettison the Copernican mediocrity 
principle by  way of observer self-selection; it does not, however, imply a 
rejection of naturalism, and is in no way a veiled creationism. However, it 
does have spiritual corollaries. The Earth is, indeed, from a first person 
perspective, an extremely unlikely event, a miracle. In the next section, we 
will explore the spiritual implications of such a miracle, by understanding life 
on Earth as a gift.
6. Life as a Gift 
What does Gaia mean, when seen as a miracle? The question is not trivial:
Being aware of the greater whole within which we live arouses feelings 
and emotional responses, such as Darwin’s awe, Huxley’s admiration 
as well as Volk’s or Sagan’s gratitude that are not anthropological 
curiosities but a necessary part of human reaction to the world. The 
emotional impact Nature makes on us is also a part of its meaning for 
us (…) and meanings give things their value. (Primavesi, 2003, 
124-125).
According to the Rare Earth Hypothesis, we are the product of an 
extraordinarily fortunate series of events that could have gone differently in 
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many different ways. We did not do anything to make this series of events 
come about; and they are not given with the expectation of a payment of any 
kind. In Gaia’s Gift, Anne Primavesi (2003) invites us to see Gaia as a freely 
given gift. We will adopt her perspective in order to understand the spiritual 
implications of the Rare Earth Hypothesis. 
Primavesi’s invitation is to understand the miracle of Gaia through our 
understanding of gifts, giving and gift exchanges. She points out the critical 
factors that were present a long time ago and the allowed us to exist:
(…) long before we emerged to do things to Gaia, Gaia was doing 
things for us: things that would prove essential for our eventual 
emergence as a species and for our lives here and now. The support 
systems essential for our survival evolved over deep time through the 
synchrony of favourable conditions within three critical parameters: 
water availability, temperature and nutrient supply (2003, 124).
What is the proper way to receive a gift? The word “gratitude” springs to 
mind. It is etymologically  related to the Latin gratis, “out of favor or kindness, 
without recompense or compensation”. A gift, freely  given, calls for gratitude; 
gratitude, in turn, must be given freely. Otherwise, there is no gift-giving but 
rather an exchange, an economic transaction.  What is it to enjoy  Earth as a 
freely given gift of chance? The poet Thomas Hardy writes:
# Let me enjoy the earth no less
Because the all-enacting might
That fashioned forth its loveliness
Had other aims than my delight (Hardy, 1978, 94, quoted in Primavesi, 
2003, 98).
A series of cosmic accidents gave us the Earth and sentience with which to 
enjoy Nature’s Opera, by pure chance. “We may not claim it as our due nor 
value it only for its usefulness to us: as something we can possess and 
exploit for our sole benefit. It is given: neither earned, bought nor 
expected” (Primavesi, 2003, 99). The proper response is gratitude. An 
anthropocentric sense of entitlement would surely  hamper Hardy’s ability  to 
enjoy the Earth.
Since its appearance in 1970, in the aftermath of the Bhola cyclone, tiny New 
Moore Island was the object of a bitter dispute between India and 
Bangladesh. In march of 2010, the island disappeared because of rising sea 
levels due to global warming (Arnoldy, 2010). That tiny bit of land was a freely 
given gift, a product of chance; its disappearance due to broader systemic 
causes shows how silly it was to claim ownership in the first place.
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A way to understand gifts and gift giving is to contrast it with commodities and 
trade. Giving stuff away for free “makes standard economic 
nonsense” (Primavesi, 2003, 113). Recently, conservative columnist Terry 
Savage wrote a column entitled “There is no Free Lemonade”, where he 
recounts him and his brother seeing three little girls at a lemonade stand, and 
his brother asking for the price of the lemonade:
# Oh, no," they replied in unison, "they're all free!"
I sat in the back seat in shock. Free? My brother questioned them 
again: "But you have to charge something? What should I pay for a 
lemonade? I'm really thirsty!"
His fiancée smiled and commented, "Isn't that cute. They have the 
spirit of giving."
That really set me off, as my regular readers can imagine.
"No!" I exclaimed from the back seat. "That's not the spirit of giving. 
You can only really give when you give something you own. They're 
giving away their parents' things -- the lemonade, cups, candy. It's not 
theirs to give."
I pushed the button to roll down the window and stuck my head out to 
set them straight.
"You must charge something for the lemonade," I explained. "That's 
the whole point of a lemonade stand. You figure out your costs -- how 
much the lemonade costs, and the cups -- and then you charge a little 
more than what it costs you, so you can make money. Then you can 
buy more stuff, and make more lemonade, and sell it and make more 
money." (Savage, 2010)
In this, Savage reflects modern conservative thinking (which, oddly enough, 
does not look kindly  upon prostitution…); he goes on to say that the 
American public fails to understand that government entitlement programs 
such as unemployment benefits are not free but taken from tax money.  He 
completely fails to see the value or meaning of gift giving. 
The giver of a gift does not expect payment in return, as an individual, but 
rather enriches the system of which he or she is a part. The girls in Savage’s 
story are making life more pleasant in their community; and invited the 
Savage brothers into it. Also, the thought of giving lemonade away to 
strangers supposes that strangers get thirsty too. Gift exchange presupposes 
“a sense of belonging to a group or place as well as a sense of dependence 
on common resources” (Primavesi, 2003, 115). Giving is closely  related to an 
awareness of being part of, and kin to,  a larger whole. The gift of Gaia 
makes us aware of the larger history of which we are a part, and of the 
The Trumpeter
ISSN: 0832-6193
Volume 27, Number 3 (2011)
German Ulises Bula                                                                                                                                             141
kinship  and dependency we have with earthly beings that brought us our 
existence both in our evolutionary past and that sustain it in the present:
Not only  does [gift exchange] presuppose a sense of belonging to a 
group or place as well as a sense of dependence on common 
resources. Its proper practice ultimately  requires seeing the vital 
components of one’s life as gifts from other living beings: gifts often 
given to us through their death. And as they have been freely given, 
they have to be received and treated as gifts: not as possessions. 
(Primavesi, 2003, 115).
Gratitude for and towards Gaia means viewing life on Earth as part of an 
enormous, complex and awesome ongoing story of which we are a part. It 
means understanding that we are not the sole recipients of the gift of life; and 
appreciating said gift as such. 
Meaningful change in our way of life, in relation to the environment, will not 
come about without a change in our fundamental attitudes toward the Earth. 
Sugar, lemons, water, are not bought from the Earth, but freely given by it; 
and to commoditize Earth’s gifts brings consequences: 
(…) the huge, interdependent, self-regulating global environment is a 
gift to all earth’s inhabitants: it gives the necessities of life to all 
members of the earth community: human and non-human. So if the 
gift aspect of our relationship  with earth is ignored and the sources of 
what we receive go unrecognized, responses to the supply  of vital 
components we receive are reduced to our saying (…) ‘It’s mine!’ We 
take those components and turn them into possessions; into 
commodities for cash profit. When this happens on a global scale, as it 
now does, we are in effect treating the earth as a possession to be 
traded for monetary advantage. This premise, and its conclusion, was 
expressed succinctly  by  an anonymous nineteenth century  Native 
American:
Only  when the last tree has died and the last river has been 
poisoned and the last fish has been caught will we realize that 
we cannot eat money. (Primavesi, 2003, 115).
7. Cosmotheoros Revisited
The pre-Copernican geocentric model of the Universe was essentially 
anthropocentric. Man was the goal and center of creation. Pre-Copernican 
geocentrism did not, as a matter of fact, hold the Earth in great esteem:
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(…) at the time, the term ‘celestial body’ (planet) was not used of the 
earth. It was considered non-celestial, belonging to the ‘sub-lunary 
world, the unworthy  world and cesspool of corruption’. It was heavy, 
inert, motionless (…)
[T]he central position was not the most honourable, but, on the 
contrary, the most unworthy. It was, in effect, the lowest, and 
consequently  suited to the earth’s imperfection. Perfection was located 
above, in the celestial vault (…) whilst ‘Hell’ was deservedly placed 
beneath the surface of the earth. (Primavesi, 2003, 21).
Man did not share the Earth’s indignity  in as much as he was meant for the 
heavens and was only passing through the Earth. Man was above the Earth, 
so much that “in the Noah story, Earth’s own fate as well as that of the rest of 
its inhabitants hinges upon what we do” (Primavesi, 2003, 22). Pre-
Coepernican Earth was, (as in Copernican Huygens), a contemptible speck 
of dirt.
Copernican heliocentrism brought humility  for man, in relation to the broader 
Universe; which we have called dark enlightenment. This humility  is manifest 
in Cosmotheoros, where the privileges of Earth are bestowed upon all 
planets. Yet, according to the Rare Earth Hypothesis, the Earth could, quite 
plausibly, be a very uncommon planet. Astronomical heliocentrism would be 
accompanied by a new form of geocentrism, in relation to the presence of 
complex life forms.
But in the Rare Earth hypothesis, man’s privilege is not the product of man’s 
being the aim or center of creation, but rather the result of a number of 
unlikely events. We are not owed this privilege, nor have we earned it. The 
Rare Earth hypothesis highlights the uniqueness of the Earth, and its nature 
as a freely  given gift. It does not exalt humanity  except as the recipient of this 
gift, and gives him a debt of gratitude. Dark enlightenment, a cosmic view of 
humanity  where it is not a privileged part of the Universe, is still possible. 
Nothing other than statistical necessity, the fact that given a sufficient number 
of trials an unlikely event becomes likely, was the cause of human privilege.
Huygens wrote, in part, to exalt the glory of the creator: “(…) we shall worship 
and reverence that God the Maker of all these things; we shall admire and 
adore his Providence and wonderful Wisdom which is displayed and 
manifested all over the Universe (…)” (Huygens, 1698, 11). In Cosmotheoros, 
the wonder and creativity of the Earth is multiplied in every planet; and we 
are to wonder at the infinite complexity  of the Universe.  But if the Earth is 
rare or unique, our wonder finds a different object. The immense complexity 
of Earth is highlighted, as opposed to the enormous, strange and awe-
inspiring, but barren objects of the rest of the Universe. Indeed “ (…) nobody 
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will deny but that there’s somewhat more of Contrivance, somewhat more of 
Miracle in the production and growth of Plants and Animals, than in lifeless 
heaps of inanimate Bodies(…)” (Huygens, 1698, 20).
Within an infinitely vast Universe that does not belong to us, there is a 
wondrous object as valuable as it is rare. If we hold on to this wonder and to 
Copernican humility at the same time, the value of the Earth becomes an 
awesome responsibility. Pre-Copernicanism was anthropocentric; a view of 
the Universe stemming from the Rare Earth Hypothesis is genuinely 
geocentric. Copernican humility  is combined with awe and gratitude for the 
Earth. The value of the sight of Nature’s Opera is not diminished, but 
enhanced.
The gifts that Huygens would bestow upon the entire Universe (pleasure, 
sight, the reason with which to enjoy the sight of Nature’s Opera) become a 
more exclusive province of man. In the model of Cosmotheoros, the Universe 
has as many observer species as there are planets; in the Rare Earth 
Hypothesis, the rational contemplation of the Universe is a more exclusive 
gift:
#(…) without Knowledge what would be Contemplation? And what 
difference is there between a Man, who with careless supine 
negligence views the Beauty and use of the Sun, and the fine golden 
Furniture of the Heaven, and one who with learned Niceness searches 
into their Courses(…) who by the sound reasoning can measure the 
magnitude and distance of the Sun and Planets? Or between such 
and one as admires perhaps the nimble Activity and strange Motions 
of some Animals, and one that knows their whole Structure, 
understands the whole Fabrik and Architecture of their composition? 
(Huygens, 1698, 60-61)
The awe with which we view the Universe is now accompanied by awe at our 
very  ability to do so. As the sole receivers of the gift of Gaia, earthlings have 
a responsibility  to protect it. As the sole observers of the Universe, humans 
have a privilege of observation beyond supine negligence.
Taking into account Gaia theory and the Rare Earth Hypothesis, the moral 
purpose of Cosmotheoros can be seen in a new light:
(…) besides the Nobleness and Pleasure of the Studies, may not we 
be so bold as to say, they  are no small help to the advancement of 
Wisdom and Morality? so far are they  from being of no use at all. For 
here we may mount from this dull Earth, and viewing it from on high, 
consider whether Nature has laid out all her cost and finery upon this 
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small speck of Dirt. So, like Travellers into other distant Countrys, we 
shall be better able to judg of what’s done at home, know how to make 
a true estimate of, and set its own value upon every  thing. We shall be 
less apt to admire what this World calls great, shall nobly  despise 
those Trifles the generality  of Men set their Affections on, when we 
know that there are a multitude of such Earths inhabited and adorned 
as well as our own. (Huygens, 1698, 10-11) 
As far as we know, there are no Earths neither inhabited nor adorned as well 
as our own. Earth is no small speck of dirt. Our human glories and travails, 
however, still seem small, as compared to the grander, more complex, and 
enormously older story of which man is but a part.
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